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We  test  the  impact  of  investor  sentiment  on  a  panel  of  international  stock  markets. 
Specifically,  we  examine  the  influence  of  investor  sentiment  on  the  probability  of  stock 
market crises. We find that investor sentiment increases the probability of occurrence of stock 
market crises within a one-year horizon. The impact of investor sentiment on stock markets is 
more  pronounced  in  countries  that  are  culturally  more  prone  to  herd-like  behavior  and 
overreaction  or  in  countries  with  low  institutional  involvement.  Results  also  suggest  that 
investors’ sentiment is not a reliable predictor of stock market reversal points. 
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Introduction 
 
Financial professionals are well aware of the impact of investors’ psychology on financial 
markets. The influence of investors’ mood on market movements is regularly discussed in 
financial  periodicals,  on  the  radio  and  on  television.  As  noted  by  Daniel  Kahneman  in  a 
speech entitled "Psychology and Market" at Northwestern University in 2000: "If you listen to 
financial analysts on the radio or on TV, you quickly learn that the market has a psychology. 
Indeed, it has character. It has thoughts, beliefs, moods, and sometimes stormy emotions." 
Traditional financial models have difficulty explaining financial crises. The crash of October 
1987, for instance, remains enigmatic for researchers. During the crash, stock prices drop an 
average of 22.6%, a decrease much larger than what can be explained by changes in economic 
variables (Black, 1988; Fama, 1989; Shiller, 1989; Seyhun, 1990; Siegel, 1992).The view 
about the market "personality", the market behavioral approach recognizes that investors are 
not "rational" but "normal" and that systematic biases in their beliefs induce them to trade on 
non-fundamental information, called "sentiment". Recently, investor sentiment has become 
the focus of studies on asset pricing.  
     Several theoretical studies offer models establishing the relationship between investors’ 
sentiment and assets prices (Black, 1986; De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990; 
Barberis,  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1998;  Daniel,  Hirshleifer  and  Subrahmanyam,  2001).  Two 
categories  of  investors  characterize  these  models:  informed  traders  rationally  anticipating 
asset  value  and  uninformed  noise  traders  who  experienced  waves  of  irrational  sentiment. 
Rational traders, who are sentiment free, correctly evaluate assets. Uninformed noise traders’ 
overly optimistic or pessimistic expectations induce strong and persistent mispricing. In these 
models,  informed  traders  and  noise  traders  compete.  Informed  traders,  the  unemotional 
investors, who force capital market prices to equal the rational present value of expected 
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stochastic noise trader sentiment. These elements prevents informed traders from taking fully 
offsetting positions to correct mispricing induced by noise traders.  Hence, to the extent that 
sentiment influences valuation, taking a position opposite to prevailing market sentiment can 
be both expensive and risky. Mispricing arises out of the combination of two factors: a change 
in sentiment on the part of the noise traders, and a limit to arbitrage. 
Several empirical studies attempt to measure investor sentiment (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 
1991; Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Brown and Cliff, 2004). These studies identified direct and 
indirect  sentiment  measures.  Direct  sentiment  measures  are  derived  from  surveys  while 
indirect  measures  relied  on  objective  variables  that  correlate  with  investor  sentiment. 
Numerous significant publications focus on the impact of sentiment on future stock returns 
(Solt and Statman, 1998; Brown and Cliff, 2005; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Finding shows 
that individual investors are easily swayed by sentiment. Sentiment indicators increases the 
traditional  model  explanatory  power  for  stocks  that  are  highly  subjective  and  difficult  to 
arbitrage,  e.g  small  stocks,  value  stocks,  stocks  with  low  prices  and  stocks  with  low 
institutional ownership.  
Despite the number of published works on the issue of investor sentiment, several avenues 
of research remain unexplored. In particular, the empirical question of a relationship between 
sentiment and stock market crises remains under researched and unresolved. Fluctuations in 
investor sentiment are often mentioned as a factor that could explain the financial crises but 
rarely analysed (White, 1990; De  Long and Shleifer, 1991; Shiller, 2000). Most previous 
studies test the ability of sentiment indicators to predict stock prices in aggregate or in period 
of normal market conditions. Few studies have attempted to directly link sentiment indicators 
to market crises. Only two studies were identified and those were limited to the U.S. stock 
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Our goal, therefore, is to study the ability of sentiment indicators to predict international 
stock market crises. To achieve our objective, we built a "leading indicator" of crises using 
data from 16 countries. By means of a logit model, we related our qualitative crises indicator 
to a set of quantitative macro-economic variables and the indicator of sentiment. Specifically, 
we tested whether consumer confidence - as a direct proxy for individual investor sentiment- 
influenced  the  probability  of  stock  market  crises  in  16  countries.  Results  confirmed  the 
significant impact of investors’ sentiment on financial crises. The impact of sentiment is more 
pronounced for countries that are culturally more prone to herd-like behavior and overreaction 
and countries with low institutional development.  
Our  study  diverges  from  previous  research  in  several  ways.  First,  we  use  investors’ 
sentiment as an indicator of financial crises. A better grasp of stock market crises should 
deepen our understanding of the dynamic process of stock price adjustments to intrinsic value. 
Second, our sample of different countries allows comparisons with U.S. data. Furthermore, 
the use of panel data is known to generate more accurate predictions for individual outcomes 
by pooling the data (Ang and Bekaert, 2007). Third, taking an international perspective allows 
us to analyse the cross-country variation in the sentiment-return relationship. A cross-country 
study can provide evidence on how cultural differences as well as institutional differences 
affect  the  sentiment-return  relation.  Finally,  focusing  on  stock  market  crises  allows  us  to 
examine the concept of price reversal, another under researched phenomenon.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The second section is devoted to a 
summary of the literature. The third section presents the methodology and variables used to 
explain the probability of a stock market crisis. The fourth section analyzes the empirical 
results  obtained.  The  fifth  section  investigates  cross-country  results.  In  the  sixth  section, 
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2. Literature Review 
       
The relationship between the variables sentiment and stock returns is at odds with classic 
finance theory which states that stock prices mirror the discounted value of expected cash-
flows  and  that  irrationalities  among  market  participants  are  removed  by  arbitrageurs.  
Behavioral finance, on the other hand, suggests that optimistic and/or pessimistic investors’ 
expectations affect asset prices. Baker and Wurgler (2006) pointed out that sentiment-based 
mispricing is based on an uninformed demand of some investors, the noise traders, and a limit 
to arbitrage. Since it is unknown how long buying or selling pressures from overly optimistic 
or  pessimistic  noise  traders  will  persist,  mispricing  can  be  persistent.  However,  every 
mispricing must eventually be corrected so one should observe that high levels of investor 
optimism are followed by low returns and vice versa. 
Validation for behavioral finance started with studies examining the correlation between 
macro-economic variables and stock prices. The process by which security prices adjust to the 
release of new information has also been studied extensively. Results of these studies show 
that stock prices reflect more than fundamental variables. As early as  1971, Niederhoffer 
highlights  the  weak  stock  market  reaction  to  events  considered  important  (Election,  War, 
Change of foreign leadership…, etc,) while very strong asset price variations remain difficult 
to explain. More recently, Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) examined stock price changes 
in relation to the arrival of information about macro-economic performance. They established 
that  macro-economic  variables  explained  approximately  a  third  of  the  variance  in  stock 
returns.  They  also  showed  that  information,  such  as  news  about  wars,  the  presidency,  or 
significant changes in financial policies explain some but not all of the variance in stock 
returns. These findings are similar to those reported by Shiller (2000) who established that 
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Stock  price  volatility  during  crashes  defies  the  explanatory  power  of  the  traditional 
financial  models.  The  conventional  models,  in  which  unemotional  investors  force  capital 
market  prices  to  equal  the  rational  present  value  of  expected  future  cash  flows,  have 
considerable difficulty explaining stock price volatility. Researchers in finance have therefore 
been working to supplement these traditional models. Shiller (1987) surveyed both individual 
and institutional investors inquiring about their behavior during the 1987 crash. He showed 
that most investors interpreted the crash as the outcome of other investors’ psychology rather 
than  fundamental  financial  variables  such  as  earnings  or  interest  rates.  Siegel  (1992) 
confirmed that changes in corporate profits and interest rates were unable to explain the rise 
and  subsequent  collapse  of  stock  prices  in  1987.  He  suggested  that  a  shift  in  investor 
sentiment was a factor in the stock market’s deep decline
1. During his speech on December 5, 
1996  at  the  American  Enterprise  Institute,  Greenspan  delivered  his  memorable  line  that 
“....irrational  exuberance  has  unduly  escalated  asset  values...”.  Greenspan’s  warning, 
unfortunately, did not prevent the swelling and bursting of the tech bubble in 2000. 
The events of 1987 and 2000 have led several well renowned financial economists to 
distance themselves from the traditional finance theory (Black, 1986; Shiller 1989; Thaler, 
1999; Rubinstein, 2001; Shefrin, 2005). Most financial economists recognized that the market 
has mood swings and considered behavioral finance as an alternative. The link between asset 
valuation  and  investor  sentiment  became  the  subject  of  considerable  deliberation  among 
financial economists. A vast number of empirical investigations with different measures of 
investor  sentiment  have  been  conducted.  While  theoretical  models  have  incorporated  the 
existence  of  noise  traders  into  equilibrium  asset  pricing  early,  empirical  evidence  on  the 
correct proxy for sentiment or on the significance of investor sentiment does not provide clear 
findings. 
                                                 
1 Contrary to this finding, Baur, Quintero and Stevens (1996) reported that during the periods that surrounded the 
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Neal and Wheatley (1998) examined the forecast power of three popular measures of 
individual investor sentiment: the level of discounts on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot 
sales to purchases and the net mutual fund redemptions. They found that net fund redemptions 
predict the size premium and the difference between small and large firm returns. They also 
reported a positive relationship between discounts and small firm’s expected returns but no 
relationship between discount and large firm’s expected returns. These results are consistent 
with the investor sentiment hypothesis that small firms stocks are held primarily by small 
investors. Brown and Cliff (2004) scrutinize various direct and indirect sentiment indicators. 
They report that direct (surveys) and indirect measures of sentiment are correlated. Although 
indicators of sentiment strongly correlated with contemporaneous market returns, they show 
that sentiment has little predictive power for near-term future stock returns. Qiu and Welch 
(2006)  reported  that  surveys  measuring  investors’  sentiment  are  related  to  other  popular 
measures of investors’ sentiment and to recent stock market returns. They also showed that 
although  indirect  measures  circumvent  the  lack  of  sample  size  and  statistical 
representativeness of the direct measurements, the theoretical link to investor sentiment is 
weaker than with the direct indicators.  
Other indirect indicators using statistical series from futures trading activities can also be 
found in the literature. Simon and Wiggins (2001) measured sentiment using the put-call ratio 
and found that the sentiment indicators are statistically and economically useful contrarian 
indicators  in  the  S&P  500  futures  market.  Schmitz,  Glaser,  and  Weber  (2005)  identified 
warrant trades as an effective measure of sentiment. Lee and Song (2003) measured noise 
investors’  sentiment  with  the  equity  put-call  ratio  and  the  market  volatility  (VIX)  index.  
Their findings provided insights into the relationship between trading volume and volatility 
by  considering  the  changing  sentiments  of  different  traders.  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2006) 
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investor measures suggested in the literature (trading volume as measured by NYSE turnover; 
the dividend premium; the closed-end fund discount; the number and first-day  returns on 
IPOs; the equity share in new issue). They found that the sentiment effects are stronger among 
stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage.    
Much work has been aimed at studying the impact of direct measures on the stock returns. 
However, the results of these investigations have also been mixes. Solt and Statman (1988) 
and  Clarke  and  Statman  (1998)  find  that  the  sentiment  indicator  published  by  Investors 
Intelligence is useless as an indicator of future stock price changes. Fisher and Statman (2000) 
studied the sentiments of three groups of investors: small investors, newsletter writers, and 
Wall Street strategists, and found that the sentiments of both small investors and Wall Street 
strategists  were  reliable  contrary  indicators  for  future  S&P  500  stock  returns,  but  no 
statistically significant relation between the sentiment of newsletter writers and stock returns 
was uncovered. Using survey data on investor sentiment, Brown and Cliff (2005) provided 
evidence that sentiment affects asset valuation. The authors show that excessive optimism 
leads  to  periods  of  market  overvaluation  and  high  current  sentiment  is  followed  by  low 
cumulative long-run return.  
Other  studies  focusing  on  indexes  of  consumer  confidence  analyzed  the  impact  of 
sentiment on the stock market. Otoo (1999) reported a strong contemporaneous relationship 
between changes in the consumer confidence index and the stock returns. Examining the 
causal  relationship  among  the  variables,  she  stated  that  returns  Granger-cause  consumer 
confidence  at  very  short  horizons  but  not  vice  versa.  Fisher  and  Statman  (2003)  found 
statistically significant relationships between some components of consumer confidence and 
subsequent  NASDAQ  and  small  cap  returns.  Charoenrook  (2006)  examined  whether 
sentiment, as measured by yearly change in the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
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predicted  excess  stock  market  returns.  Lemmon  and  Portniaguina  (2006)  also  reported 
evidence  that  investors  appear  to  overvalue  small  stocks  relative  to  large  stocks  during 
periods  when  consumer  confidence  is  high  and,  vice  versa.  Moreover,  Schmeling  (2009) 
examined whether consumer confidence affects expected stock returns in 18 industrialized 
countries.  In  line  with  recent  evidence  for  the  U.S,  he  found  that  sentiment  negatively 
forecasts aggregate stock market returns on average across countries. This relation also holds 
for returns of value stocks, growth stocks, small stocks, and for different forecasting horizons. 
Similarly, Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2009) constructed indexes of investor sentiment for six 
major  stock  markets  and  decomposed  them  into  one  global  and  six  local  indices.  They 
determined that sentiment, both global and local, is a statistically and economically significant 
contrarian  predictor  of  market  returns,  particularly  for  highly  subjective  and  difficult  to 
arbitrage stocks. This extends prior US evidence to international markets.  
The prior literature review highlights the lack of consensus about the best measure of 
sentiment or on whether sentiment in fact affects stock prices. While existing studies test the 
impact of sentiment on individual stocks and portfolios of stocks whose valuations are highly 
subjective and difficult to arbitrage, this paper takes a different approach. We propose to test 
the impact of investor sentiment on international capital markets by studying its ability to 
predict stock market crises. A priori, stock market crises should be preceded by periods of 
rising  investor  euphoria.  Therefore,  we  expect  that  periods  characterized  by  excessive 
investors’ optimism are followed by stock market crises.   
3. The stock market crises and the role of investor sentiment  
 
As  mentioned  above,  our  goal  is  to  test  the  ability  of  investor  sentiment  to  predict 
international stock market crises. The study includes 15 European countries and the United 
States. Data includes monthly observations for the period between April 1995 and June 2009. 
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discussed  below,  our  study  includes  financial  and  macro-economic  variables  and  survey 
results.  The  list  of  the  countries  and  the  data  sources  used  are  presented  respectively  in 
appendix 1 and table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
    3.1. Identification of stock market crises 
  
Most studies define equity crises as an abrupt and rapid drop in the overall market index. 
The change of the index can be the predecessor of larger decreases, higher dispersions of 
probable losses and/or more uncertainty about the return of firms. The first step of our study 
consists of identifying the financial crises that have occurred during the period considered in 
the regions studied. To achieve this goal, we use the methodology proposed by Patel and 
Sarkar (1998) which is, according to these authors, widely used by practitioners. 
In their study, Patel and Sarkar (1998) designed a crises indicator called CMAX. The 
CMAX compares the current value of an index with its maximum value over the previous T 
periods, usually 1 to 2 years. The CMAX ratio is calculated by dividing the current price by 
the maximum price over the previous two year period.  
) ..., max( , 24 ,
,
,
t i t i
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Where Pit is the stock market index at time t for country i. The rolling maximum in the 
denominator was defined over a relatively short period (24 months) to avoid losing too many 
data points. 
Boucher (2004) describes the CMAX as an indicator of the decline in volatility. This 
indicator equals 1 if prices rise over the period considered, indicating a bullish market. The 
more  prices  fall,  the  closer  the  CMAX  gets  to  0.  A  crisis  is  detected  whenever  CMAX 
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counting the same crisis more than once, a crisis is automatically eliminated if detected twice 
over a twelve month period. 
The stock market crises indicator for country i at time t, Ci,t, is defined as follow:  
i i t i CMAX C s   2 CMAX   if   1 t i, , - < =  
                                         otherwise   , 0 , = t i C  
 
 Given the indicator structure, share price decreases are already well in progress when a 
crisis is identified, i.e. Ci,t uncovers abnormal drops in prices rather than the market turning 
point. This indicator only identifies as crises those events that eliminate the previous two 
years of gains.  
Similarly to Patel and Sarkar (1998), we define the following concepts : (i) the beginning 
of  a  crises  as  the  month  when  the  index  reaches  its  historical  maximum  over  the  2-year 
window  prior  to  the  month  when  the  crash  is  triggered,  (ii)  the  beginning  of  the  crash 
corresponds to the month when the CMAX intersects with a threshold, (iii) the date of trough 
is the month when the price index reaches its minimum, (iv) the date of recovery is the first 
month after the crash when the index reaches the pre-crash maximum, (v) the magnitude of 
the crises is the difference between the value of the index at its maximum and at its minimum, 
(vi) the length of the trough is the number of months between the date of the beginning of the 
crises and the date of the trough, and (vii) the length of the recovery period is the number of 
months for the index to return to the maximum. 
Figure 1 illustrates these concepts on the US stock market. As shown, three crises are 
identified during the period 1995-2009. The first crash occurred in July 2001 and reached a 
trough eleven months later in June 2002. It was characterized by a decrease of 40% in the 
S&P500 and the crisis ended 81 months later, in April 2007. The second crash took place in 
August 2002. It took 52 months for the market to regain the 43% loss during the crisis. The 
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    Table 2 presents the characteristics of the crises identified in our sample. During the period 
analyzed, we detect 44 crises, i.e. an average of 2.75 per country. Consistent with Roll (1988) 
who found substantial price increases in many international stock markets in the nine months 
prior to the October 1987 stock crash, the average returns before the crises are high. In our 
sample, the pre-crises annual median returns are equal to 86.38%. Further, most of the crises 
identified  correspond  to  well  known  historical  events,  such  as  the  internet  bubble  of  the 
2000’s and the recent subprime crisis.   
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
3.2. The methodology used to link investor sentiment to stock market crises 
 
The  seventies  saw  the  emergence  of  the  first  models  for  forecasting  crises  including 
banking crises and currency crises (Early Warning Models or Early Warning Signals). Most 
of these models used discriminant analysis and logit/probit models. Discriminant analysis is a 
method used to find linear combinations of features which best separate two or more classes 
of  objects  or  events,  in  this  case,  healthy  countries  from  those  facing  difficulties.  
Discriminant analysis is not designed to determine the causes of crises. Logit/probit models
2, 
on the other hand, help to isolate "leading indicators" of financial crises. The idea underlying 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion of logit models, see Maddala (1983).  
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these models is to identify economic variables having a specific behavior before the onset of 
the crises and to estimate the probability of occurrence of these crises during a specific period 
(usually  one  or  two  years),  taking  into  account  the  information  these  variables  included 
(Frankel et Rose, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt et Detragiache, 2000; Bussiere et Fratzscher, 2006; 
Lau et Yan, 2005).  Our approach, outlined below, is inspired by the logit/probit models.  
￿  The dependent variable  
   
The  logit  approach  has  the  advantage  of  providing  a  framework  for  statistically 
measuring the magnitude and significance of the effects of various explanatory variables on 
the onset of a financial crisis. It explains the occurrence or the non-occurrence of a crisis with 
a binary variable and explanatory variables found in the real sector of the economy, i.e. 
financial variables, external sector and fiscal variables.  
The  logit  model  of  the  occurrence  of  a  crisis  with  lagged  values  of  early  warning 
indicators as explanatory variables requires the construction of a crisis dummy variable that 
serves as the endogenous variable in the regression. To construct our dependent variable, we 
closely follow the methodology of Brussiere and Fratzcher (2006). Using the crises defined 
above, we define a dummy variable Ii,t. Ii,t equals to 1 during the crisis and the twelve months 
preceding it and 0 during calm time periods. The 11 months following the crisis are excluded, 
as the post-crisis period is irrelevant for the estimation and may even distort the quality of the 
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￿  The independent variables  
 
The following sub-sections present the variables proposed to explain the crises detected 
in the sample. The first sub-section introduces “traditional” variables. The second sub-section 
focuses on the variable sentiment. 
·  The traditional variables  
 
Contrary to banking and currencies crises where studies are abundant, very few studies 
have been published about the variables explaining the stock market crises. For the period 
1929 – 2000, the literature indentified two groups of variables
3. 
The first group of explanatory variables reflects the price acceleration and the divergence 
between asset prices and their intrinsic value. The variables are the year-on-year change in 
stock prices (RET) and the price earnings ratios (PER).  
The RET is a good substitute for price acceleration and decline. Indeed, the returns tend to 
decline gradually before the onset of the crisis. The PER is widely used to express a firm's 
market valuation relative to its fundamental value. Campbell and Shiller (2001) showed that 
when stock market valuation ratios are at extreme levels by historical standards, some weight 
should be given to the mean-reversion theory that prices will fall in the future to bring the 
ratios back to more normal historical levels. Indeed, If we accept the premise for the moment 
that valuation ratios will continue to fluctuate within their historical ranges in the future, and 
neither move permanently outside nor get stuck at one extreme of their historical ranges, then 
when a valuation ratio is at an extreme level either the numerator or the denominator of the 
ratio must move in a direction that restores the ratio to a more normal level. 
The second group of variables includes monetary aggregates and an indicator of financial 
instability. In this category, we retain inflation rate (INF), real interest rate (INT) and ratio 
domestic credit/GDP (CREDIT).    
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Stock prices are negatively correlated to inflation and financial crises are characterized by 
high  volatility  of  inflation  (Nelson,  1976;  Fama  et  Schwert,  1977;  Blanchard,  1993).  For 
example, Fama and Schwert (1977) established that most stock markets have the tendency to 
perform  poorly  when  inflation  is  high.  Using  US  data  since  1789,  Bordo  and  Wheelock 
(1998)  showed  that  most  financial  crises  occurred  during  periods  with  high  variation  in 
inflation. The interest rates are also often cited as a good indicator of financial crises. Interest 
rates tend to decline significantly before the collapse of the stock markets. Finally, Domestic 
credit,  another  independent  variable,  is  used  to  capture  financial  instability  often  visible 
before financial crises. As documented in Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Goldstein 
(1998) and Kamin (1999), when domestic credit grows at a fastest rate than GDP, this can 
lead to excessive risk-taking from investors with large losses on loans in the future. With 
rapid  growth  of  lending,  banking  institutions  might  not  be  able  to  add  the  necessary 
managerial capital (well-trained loan officers, risk-assessment systems, etc.) fast enough to 
enable these institutions to screen and monitor these new loans appropriately. The outcome of 
the lending boom leads to the deterioration in bank balance sheets, leading economies into 
financial crises. 
·  The behavioral variable  
 
A universally accepted measure of investor sentiment has not yet been identified. The 
financial  literature  proposes  two  categories  of  proxies  for  investor  sentiment,  direct  and 
indirect  indicators.  Direct  sentiment  measures  are  based  on  polling  market  participants 
through  surveys.  Indirect  measures  are  made  up  of  a  time  series  of  macro-economic  and 
financial variables, used to proxy the unobserved sentiment factor
4. 
For this study, we favored the consumer confidence index
5. This variable seizes some of 
the  crises  aspects  not  already  contained  in  macro-economic  indicators.  The  use  of  the 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Brown and Cliff (2004) for a detailed discussion of sentiment measures. 
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consumer confidence index appeared logical. First, data on the consumer confidence index is 
available for the majority of developed countries since the mid-80s. Second, because most 
countries use similar surveys to gather data, comparisons across countries are possible
6.  
 Notice  that  we  are  not  alone;  among  the  various  direct  indicators,  the  consumer 
confidence index seems to be the preferred indicator of the majority of researchers. Otoo 
(1999), Fisher and Statman (2003), Qiu and Welch (2006) and Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006) presented several additional arguments in support of this variable: 
·  Although consumers polled for the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index 
are  not  asked  directly  for  their  views  on  security  prices,  changes  in  the  Consumer 
Confidence Index correlate very highly with changes in stock prices.  
·  Participation  of  individual  households  in  financial  markets  has  increased  substantially 
over  recent  years  suggesting  that  measures  of  consumer  confidence  may  be  a  useful 
barometer of how individual investors feel about the economy and the financial markets 
·  Researchers utilize longitudinal data which allows for more robust and significant studies. 
Direct measures of sentiment derived from surveys circumvent some of the drawbacks of 
indirect measures
7.  
·  Because  the  consumer  confidence  index  captures  individual  beliefs,  it  reflects  the 
philosophy of behavioral finance; including the opinions of imperfect people who have 
social, cognitive, and emotional biases (Shleifer, 2000). 
Finally, as many researchers
8 emphasize that the direct indicator of sentiment reflects an 
economic component and a psychological aspect, we decompose the consumer confidence 
index into a component related to the business cycle, i.e. macroeconomic “fundamentals” and 
                                                 
6 The European questionnaires have been harmonized since the mid-80s. Michigan consumer confidence survey 
covers  5  years.    The  European  survey  covers  1  year  and  has  an  average  number  of  participants  of  3000 
respondents.   
7 Because indirect measures are made up of time series of macro-economic and financial variables, they may not 
exclusively represent investors’ sentiment.  
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a  residual  component  that  we  interpret  as  a  purer  measure  of  “sentiment”  (SENT
^). 
Specifically, we treat the residual from the following regression as our measure of sentiment 
unwarranted by fundamentals
9.  
              ,
1




t i j FUND SENT




The  variables  that  capture  the  component  related  to  the  business  cycle,  i.e. 
macroeconomic “fundamentals” (FUND) are: (i) the changes of the industrial production (IP), 
(ii) the growth in consumption of durables (CD), non-durables (CND) and services (CS), (iii) 
the spread defined as the difference in yield between the 10-year and 3-month government 
bonds  (ST)  and  (iv)  the  dividend  yield  measured  as  the  dividend  divided  by  the  market 
capitalization (DY). We believe that these variables are as comprehensive as those commonly 
used in the literature. This procedure reduces the likelihood that variation in sentiment is 
related to systematic macroeconomic risks. The sentiment measure is orthogonalized with 
respect to several contemporaneous variables.  
￿  The model used 
 
The dependent variable Ii,t is explained by the macro-economic indicators and the variable 
sentiment  via  a  logit  model,  i.e.  we  explained  our  crises  indicator  (Ii,t)  with  a  set  of 
quantitative macro-economic variables and the indicator of sentiment. In seeking to estimate 
the probability that the variable Ii,t is equal to 1, we estimate the probability of a crisis within a 
1  year window. In other terms, the model attempts to predict whether a crisis will occur 
during the coming 12 months.  
Specially, we successively estimate three different logit models. Model 1 includes only 
macro-economic  variables.  Model  2  focuses  on  sentiment.  Model  3  combines  macro- 
economic and sentiment variables
10.   
                                                 
9 Due to lack of space, we are not reporting all the regression results. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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In the equations above, Ii,t is the crisis indicator variable defined above, X
k the matrix of 
explanatory variables, αk the vector of coefficient estimates and f a logistical function of the 
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3.3. The model forecasting ability 
    
To  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  model,  we  use  the  signals  approach  (Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Bussiere and Fratzscher, 
2006). The method compares the probability of a crisis generated by the model, the models 
predicted probability, with the actual occurrence of a crisis. As the predicted probability is a 
continuous variable, we must decide on a cut-off or threshold probability above which the 
predicted probability can be interpreted as sending a signal of a pending crisis. The model 
performs well if the predicted probability corresponds to a crisis as identified in our sample. 
As shown in the table 3, four situations are possible:  
 
Table 3: Evaluating the performance logit model 
 
Model logit    
Signal was issued  No signal was issued  
The indicator 
forecasts a crisis 
Iit =1 
Crisis properly planned  Signal Missing 
(Error A) 
Actual 
crisis   The indicator does 








Table 3 shows two kinds of errors. In the case of type A errors, the model does not detect 
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indicator would only produce observations that belong to the north-west (NW) and south-east 
(SE) cells of this matrix, minimizing the type A and type B errors. 
The performance of logit model depends largely on these two types of errors. The main 
question is the optimal threshold level. The lower the threshold, the more signals the model 
will  send  with  the  drawback  of  having  numerous  false  signals.  By  contrast,  raising  the 
threshold will reduce the number of false signals at the expense of an increase in the number 
of missed crises signals. Notice, however that the costs associated with the two types of errors 
are not the same. Type A errors, missing a crisis that ended up materializing, are larger than 
type B errors consisting of incorrectly anticipating a crisis that will not occur. As suggested 
by Berg and Patillo (1998), Boucher (2004) and Coudert and Gex (2008), we decided to 
present the results for alert thresholds set at 25% and 50%. 
4.  Regression results  
 
Our  goal  is  to  estimate  the  incremental  predictive  power  of  the  sentiment  variable 
compared to other variables habitually used in the literature. The findings are presented in 
three parts. Part 1 shows the results of a model including the fundamental economic and 
financial  variables.  Part  2  focuses  on  the  sentiment  variable.  Part  3  combines  economic, 
financial and sentiment indicators. Table 4 presents the results.   
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
4.1. The predictive power of the traditional variables   
 
With the exception of the INF variable, all macro-economic variables included in Model 1 
are significant and display the expected sign. The model is performing well, the maximum 
likelihood confirms the quality of the overall fit of the model and the hypothesis of joint 
nullity of all the regression coefficients except the constant can be rejected. 
These findings add credibility to PER, RET, INT and CREDIT as predictors of financial 
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Traditionally, the PER is used to give an idea of what the market is willing to pay for the 
company’s earnings. A stock with a high PER is often interpreted as an overpriced stock 
while a stock with low PER may indicate a “vote of no confidence.” Our study shows that an 
increase in the PER is positively correlated with the probability of a financial crisis. This 
result supports the mean-reversion theory that when prices are high they will fall, bringing the 
PER back to normal historical levels. 
The  variable  INT  negatively  impacts  the  probability  of  a  financial  crisis.  This  result 
explains why monetary authorities cut rates to stabilize the economy and limit the adverse 
consequences of bursting bubbles. The sign is also negative for retuns (RET), which already 
tend to decline at the onset of the crisis. As far as the variable CREDIT is concerned, a 
positive  and  significant  coefficient  supports  previously  reported  studies  that  financial 
aggregates,  such  as  domestic  credit,  are  early  indicators  of  financial  crises.  Rapid  credit 
growth  has  been  associated  with  macroeconomic  and  financial  crises,  originating  from 
macroeconomic imbalances and banking sector distress. This is why policymakers face the 
dilemma of how to minimize the risks of financial crisis while still allowing bank lending to 
contribute to higher growth and efficiency. 
Contrary to our expectations, the variable INF is negatively correlated to the probability of 
a financial crisis.  A significant negative coefficient is intuitively difficult to comprehend as it 
implies that policymakers' commitment to price stability increases the probability of a crisis.  
A  negative  correlation,  can  however,  be  explained  by  the  “paradox  of  credibility”.  
Goodfriend (2001) and Borio and Lowe (2002) showed that when inflation is under control, 
tensions of productivity cannot be detected by inflation numbers but rather by instability in 
the  financial  sector
11.  The  idea  has  been  shared  by  the  BIS  economists,  who  have  been 
                                                 
11 The bursting of the technology bubble in the beginning of the years 2000 and the recent subprime crises took 
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arguing along these lines for years, finding more sympathetic ears among central bankers than 
among academics.  
McFadden R
2 statistic is 40.1%, suggesting the quality of the regression. The results also 
show that the percentage of crises correctly predicted stock market is high. Types A errors are 
low showing that the model predicts correctly 64% (threshold 50%) and 70% (threshold 25%) 
of the  crises. Note  also that Types B errors  (false alarms)  are relatively low for the two 
thresholds (15.21% when the threshold is 50% and 21.67% when the threshold is 25%).  
4.2. The predictive power of the variable sentiment 
 
Results from the second model tend to confirm our hypothesis about the variable SENT
^. 
The variable is statistically significant and it shows the expected positive sign. The model 
predicts  correctly  47%  and  68%  of  the  crises  at  threshold  of  50%  and  25%  and  the 
percentages of Type B errors are low (13.27% when the threshold is 50% and 16.21% when 
the threshold is 25%). 
This result corroborates one of the fundamental hypotheses of behavioral finance that 
there is a negative relationship between investor’s sentiment and the future performance of 
stocks (Lee, Shleifer et Thaler, 1991; Neal et Wheatley, 1998; Glushkov, 2006; Schmeling, 
2009). When investor sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high. On the other 
hand,  when  sentiment  is  high,  the  pattern  is  reversed;  stocks  are  overpriced  and  will 
experience  a  decline  in  value.  Stocks  market  bubbles  coincide  with  periods  of  overly 
optimistic investors. However, every mispricing must eventually be corrected so excessive 
optimism (overvaluation of the market) will inevitably be followed by sharp drops in stock 
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4.3. The incremental predictive power of the variable sentiment  
 
Results of the third model show that the variable SENT
^ remains significant even after 
controlling  for  the  financial  and  economic  variables.  Results  also  indicate  that  with  the 
exception of PER, all fundamental variables remain significant and keep their expected signs. 
These findings suggest that the use a variable sentiment rather than the traditional PER 
improves our ability to predict stock prices departure from their fundamental values. Indeed, 
when the sentiment indicator is introduced in the model, the price-earnings ratio losses its 
explanatory power. This is a significant result as the price-earnings ratio is always the focus 
of management. This result should be pleasing to financial analysts who often complain that 
the PER multiples are unsophisticated discount factors failing to account for, among many 
factors, interest rates and/or inflation rates over the forecast periods.  
The  model  displays  good  results.  The  introduction  of  variable  SENT  improves  the 
statistical quality of the model, the McFadden R
2 gains about 6.1% when compared to the first 
model. The model also predicts correctly 72% and 81% of the crises at thresholds of 50% and 
25%.  Adding  a  sentiment  indicator,  in  addition  to  macroeconomic  variables,  improve  the 
model prediction of the stock market crises
12.  
4.4. Out-of-sample performance of logit model    
 
If a relatively low percentage of errors is necessary to establish the quality of the model, it 
is not sufficient to conclude that the model is efficient (Berg and Pattillo, 1999). Thus, it is 
necessary to determine its relevance from out-of-sample observations to judge the validity of 
the logit model. The logit model should be estimated over a given period, then simulated out-
of-sample. To test whether our model is able to predict crises out-of-sample, we estimate the 
                                                 
12 One potential drawback of the logit model with pooled data is that it ignores the cross-section and time series 
dimensions of the data. For example, the legal system or the political situation of a country could be such that we 
permanently understate the probability of a stock market crisis (see Brussiere and Fratzcher, 2006, p.960). To 
check the robustness of our results, we estimate panel logit model with fixed and random effects. The results 
obtained are virtually the same. This suggests that ignoring country-specific information does not constitute a 
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model on April 1995-December 2007 and compute the probability of a crisis in the following 
12 months. The goal is to test the accuracy of predictions on out-of-sample data, i.e., the crisis 
at the end of our sample (the subprime crisis in 2008).      
We find that the model is performing well, even out-of-sample, predicting most of the 
subprime crises occurring during the year 2008. The model failed to predict only the crisis of 
Denmark in September 2008, the predicted probability of a stock market crisis in Denmark is 
equal to 0.198
13. Overall, the out-of-sample performance of our model is so robust and would 
have allowed the correct anticipation of the most recent subprime crisis.   
5. Cross-country analyses  
   
We  examine  whether  our  results  are  sensitive  to  the  countries  been  allocated  in  two 
groups  depending  on  some  determinants  of  market  integrity  and  herd-like  overreaction.  
Specifically, we use our cross-section of countries to determine if there is evidence that the 
impact of sentiment on stock market crises is higher for countries with less market integrity 
and for countries culturally prone to overreaction-like behavior and herd behavior.   
Market  integrity  means  that  financial  markets  with  higher  level  of  institutional 
sophistication are characterized by a better flow of information and are consequently more 
efficient.  The  market  integrity  variables  retained  in  our  study  can  be  found  in  La  Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Chui, Titman and Wei (2008) and Schmeling 
(2009).  These  variables  include  (i)  the  index  of  anti-director  rights,  (ii)  the  corruption 
perception index and (iii) the accounting standards index
14. 
The variables used to assess herd-like overreaction are rooted in the article of Hofstede 
(2001). The first index measures the level of individualism of a country and the second one, 
the  so-called  uncertainty  avoidance  index,  measures  individual’s  attitude  toward  new  and 
                                                 
13 For Denemark, the out-of-sample predicted probability of a crisis in the following 12 months is below the 25% 
threshold.  Detailed results are available upon request.  
14 In order to make results easier to interpret, we have rescaled all market integrity indicators. Higher value 
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unexpected occurrences. According to Hofstede (2001), individualism affects the degree to 
which people display an independent behavior rather than a dependent behavior. The author 
argued that children in collectivistic cultures build their identity from their social system. He 
showed that higher levels of collectivism indicate a tendency towards herd like behavior. The 
uncertainty avoidance index measures the degree to which a culture programs its members to 
react to new and unusual situations. Hofstede (2001) documented that people in countries 
with high uncertainty avoiding levels react in a more emotional way compared to countries 
with low levels of uncertainty avoidance. Therefore we use the uncertainty avoidance as a 
proxy  of  the  tendency  of  individuals  to  overreact.  Hofstede  (2001)  showed  that  the 
uncertainty avoidance index is correlated with the collectivism index since the uncertainty 
avoidance index captures cross-country differences in the propensity of people to follow the 
same sets of rules and thus to behave in the same manner. Therefore, higher levels of the 
uncertainty avoidance behavior should indicate a tendency towards more herd-like behavior. 
Findings are depicted in Table 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
For both groups of countries, the McFadden R
2 is higher when sentiment is added in the 
model. However, results show that the variable SENT
^ is only significant for the group of 
countries showing high herd-like behavior and low market integrity. For the other group, 
SENT
^ is significant when the index uncertainty avoidance is used. Furthermore, the model 
quality is good.  We find that the errors of types A and B are lower for collectivistic countries, 
countries  with  high  uncertainty  avoiding  index  and  countries  with  low  institutional 
involvement.  
Findings  show  that  using  the  variable  sentiment  improves  our  ability  to  predict  stock 
prices departure from their fundamental values in countries where herd-like behavior  and 
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indicates that culture has a different effect on stock market crises, a result consistent with the 
idea that investors in different cultures have different biases.  
6. Investor sentiment as a predictor of reversals market points  
 
Results so far indicate that the introduction of a sentiment indicator improves our forecast 
of stock market crises. From the viewpoint of the investor, however, it is more important to 
identify the turning point of the market then the moment when falling prices have reached an 
abnormally low level.  
Contrary to previous studies on investors’ sentiment, our methodology can be adjusted to 
study  the  market  reversals  points.  Specifically,  we  use  the  dates  of  peaks  previously 
determined to detect the turning points of the stock markets. As with the prediction of stock 
market crises, we construct an binary indicator PRi,t
15. The indicator takes the value of 1 for 
the month corresponding to the top of the index and the twelve months before the top and 0 
otherwise. The 11 months following the peak are excluded from the sample. Our model is 
now adapted to identify these stock market reversals points. Table 5 summarizes findings.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Sentiment indicator is positively correlated with the probability that asset prices reach 
their highest level within a one-year horizon. In other words, when our model includes a 
sentiment indicator it predicts the potential of triggering a stock market crisis in the next 12 
with more accuracy than when only traditional financial and macroeconomic indicators are 
used. Financial crises are often preceded by excess optimist leading to value securities above 
their fundamental values. The euphoria of investors drives up stock prices leading to financial 
crises within a one-year horizon.     
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The introduction of variable sentiment improves the prediction of turning points both in 
terms of quality of regression or quality forecasting. Notice however that these results must be 
interpreted with caution. Indeed, the percentages of errors of types A and B are relatively 
large and the McFadden R
2 does not exceed 14.2%. Thus, predicting stock market reversals 
provides weaker performance than forecasting crises.  
Conclusion  
 
The general finding of a sentiment-return relation is at odds with standard finance theory 
which predicts that stock prices reflect the discounted value of expected cash-flows and that 
irrationalities among market participants are erased by arbitrageurs. In contrast, the behavioral 
approach  suggests  that  waves  of  irrational  sentiment,  i.e.  times  of  overly  optimistic  or 
pessimistic expectations, can persist and affect asset prices for significant periods of time, 
eventually generating crises. This paper attempts to assess the relationship between investor 
sentiment and stock market crises. 
Specifically, our paper empirically examines the influence of investor sentiment on the 
probability of occurrence of stock market crises over the period 1995-2009. We use panel data 
of 15 European countries and the United States to estimate a multivariate logit model.  It 
appears that the sentiment of investors positively influence the probability of occurrence of 
stock market crises within a one-year horizon. Furthermore, the investor sentiment provides 
an incremental predictive power compared to other variables routinely used in the literature. 
The impact of investor sentiment on stock markets is stronger for countries that culturally 
more prone to herd-like behavior and overreaction and countries with low efficient regularity 
institutions. This result is important for portfolio managers; investors’ sentiment is a good 
predictor  of  securities  overvaluation.  Finally,  this  is  a  key  result  for  financial  market 
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The data stock market indices, mainly drawn from the Datastream database for the period 
1995-2008, are the following : BEL 20 (Belgium), PRAGUE PX 50 (Czech Republic), OMX 
Copenhagen (Denmark), DAX 30 (Germany), HE GENERAL IRELAND (Ireland), ATHENS 
SE GENERAL (Greece), IBEX 35 (Spain) , CAC 40 (France), 30 MILAN COMIT (Italy), 
ESTONIA TALS INDEX (Estonia), PORTUGAL PSI-20 (Portugal), SLOVENIAN EXCH. 
STOCK (Slovenia), DJWI FINLAND (Finland), SWEDEN OMX (Sweden), FTSE 100 (UK) 
and  the  S&P  500  Composite  (U.S.).  The  PER  and  dividend  yield  on  stock  indices  are 
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The inflation data (change in the consumer prices index), the real interest rate (the money 
market rate using the consumer price index), the industrial production, the term structure, the 
GDP
16 and consumption expenditures are all taken from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). The time series of domestic bank credit come from the European Central 
Bank (ECB) for the European countries. The source is the U.S. Federal Reserve for the United 
States.  The  consumer  confidence  indices  are  provided  by  the  Economic  European 
Commission for the countries of the European  countries. The source is the University  of 




The consumer confidence index is the result of a survey of a representative population of 
households. It reflects the perceptions and expectations of households both on their economic 
and financial situation as their propensity to spend and their views on the overall economic 
situation. The survey consists of simple questions with multiple choice answers are easily 
recognized. The relative score of each question is then calculated as the percent of favourable 
replies  minus  the  percent  of  unfavorable  replies,  plus  100,  rounded  to  the  nearest  whole 
number. The Michigan  surveys are sent to households and the respondents are asked the 
following questions:  
 
Q1.  Do you think now is a good time for people to buy major household items?  
   
·  good time to buy 
·  uncertain 
·  depends 
·  bad time to buy 
 
Q2.  Would you say that you and your immediate family are better off or worse off financially 
than you were a year ago? 
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·  better 
·  same 
·  worse 
 
Q3.  Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole-do you think that during 
the next twelve months the financial condition will be? 
·  good 
·  uncertain 
·  bad 
 
Q4.  Looking at the next five years, do you think we will continue having?  
 
·  good times 
·  uncertain 
·  bad times 
 
Q5.  A year from now, do you think your immediate family will be? 
 
·  better 
·  same 
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Table 1: Description of variables used in the study  
 
 
Code  Variables  Measures  Sources 
Macroeconomics variables  
INT  Real interest rate    
Money market rate using consumer price 
index   International Financial Statistics 
INF  Inflation  Change in the natural logarithm of the 
Consumer Price Index  International Financial Statistics 
CREDIT/GDP  Domestic credit     Level of domestic credit divided by Gross 
Domestic Product 
European central Bank & Federal reserve 
system  
ST  Term spread  
Difference between the yields on 10-year 
U.S. government bonds and 3-month 
Treasury bills 
International Financial Statistics 
IP  Industrial production    Change in the natural logarithm of 
industrial production index  International Financial Statistics 
CD, CND et CS  
Growth of durable goods, non-durables 
goods and services consumption 
expenditures  
Change in the natural logarithm of durable 
goods, non-durables and services 
consumption expenditures 
International Financial Statistics  
Stock market variables 
P  Stock price index  Level of stock price index  Datastream  
PER  Price Earning Ratio  Share price divided by earning per share  Bloomberg  
DY  Dividend Yield   Cash dividend of the index divided by the 
value of the index    Bloomberg 
RET  The year-one-year change in stock prices   Yearly change in stock prices   Datastream  
Investor sentiment indicator  
SENT  Consumer sentiment index   The five questions making up the consumer 
sentiment index  
Economic European Commission & 
University of Michigan Survey Research 
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Tableau 2: Characteristics of individual market crises 
 
This table presents the characteristics of the stock market crises. The beginning of a crisis is the month when the index reaches its historical maximum over the 2-year 
window prior to the month when the crash is triggered.  The beginning of the crash corresponds to the month when the CMAX intersects with a threshold. The date of trough 
is the month when the price index reaches its minimum. The date of recovery is the first month after the crash when the index reaches the pre-crash maximum. The magnitude 
of a crisis is the difference between the value of the index at its maximum and at its minimum. The length of the trough is the number of months between the date of the 
beginning of the crisis and the date of the trough. The length of the recovery period is the number of months for the index to return to the maximum. To avoid counting the 
same crisis more than once, a crisis is automatically eliminated if detected twice over a twelve month period. 
 
 
The duration of the crisis    Annual returns before 
crises 
Annual returns after 
crises 
Beginning 
of crises  
Beginning 
of crash   
Date of 
trough   






Price decline to 
trough  
One 








10/2000  09/2002  03/2003  05/2005  29  26  46.49%  0.793%  5.09%  20.45%  22.92% 
05/2007  06/2008  03/2009  NA  13  NA   66.77%  27.80 %  53.94 %  NA  NA  
Czech Republic 
05/1994  06 /1995  07/1995  03/2004  14  105  44.98%  NA  NA  54.96%  110.25% 
11/2007  10/2008  03/2009  NA   11  NA   66.41%  24.03 %  109.26 %  NA  NA 
Denmark 
10/2000  07/2002  02/2003  01/2005  28  23  43.83%  43.23%  59.76%  36.33%  63.48% 
10/2007  09/2008  03/2009  NA  17  NA  57.77%  24.80%  49.48%  NA  NA 
Germany  
02/2000  09/2001  09/2002  NA  31  NA  67.26%  55.09%  87.98%  NA  NA 
10/2000  10/2002  03/2003  NA  17  NA  66.86%  22.72 %  84.73%  NA  NA 
10/2007  10/2008  02/2009  NA  16  NA  54.48%  32.33%  76.25%  NA  NA 
Ireland 
06/2001  06/2002  03/2003  12/2005  21  33  55.13%  21.24%  31.92%  29.87%  -44.02% 
05/2007  07/2008  02/2009  NA  21  NA  62.17%  35.24%  87.67%  NA  NA 
Greece  
11/1999  09/2001  09/2002  NA  22  NA  62.12%  98.27%  127.53%  NA  NA 
04/2001  03/2003  03/2003  09/2005  23  30  55.35%  -32.64%  20.99%  16.23%  -15.53% 
10/2007  10/2008  02/2009  NA  16  NA  71.20%   29.20%  114.30%  NA  NA 
Spain  
02/2000  08/2001  07/2002  09/2006  29  50  33.88%  25.89%  137.22%  11.94%  -9.11% 
09/2000  09/2002  09/2002  07/2005  24  34  50.39%  14.95%  50.62%  16.82%  17.45% 
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Tableau 2: Characteristics of individual market crises 
 
This table presents the characteristics of the stock market crises. The beginning of a crisis is the month when the index reaches its historical maximum over the 2-year 
window prior to the month when the crash is triggered.  The beginning of the crash corresponds to the month when the CMAX intersects with a threshold. The date of trough 
is the month when the price index reaches its minimum. The date of recovery is the first month after the crash when the index reaches the pre-crash maximum. The magnitude 
of a crisis is the difference between the value of the index at its maximum and at its minimum. The length of the trough is the number of months between the date of the 
beginning of the crisis and the date of the trough. The length of the recovery period is the number of months for the index to return to the maximum. To avoid counting the 
same crisis more than once, a crisis is automatically eliminated if detected twice over a twelve month period. 
 
 
The duration of the crisis    Annual returns before 
crises 
Annual returns after 
crises 
Beginning 
of crises  
Beginning 
of crash   
Date of 
trough   






Price decline to 
trough  
One 








08/2000  09/2001  09/2002  NA  25  NA  38.43%  44.36%  139.14%  NA  NA 
10/2000  10//2002  03/2003  NA  29  NA  50.76%  30.86%  133.55%  NA  NA 
05/2007  10/2008  02/2009  NA  21  NA  55.72%  23.80%  66.33%  NA  NA 
Italy  
08/2000  09/2001  09/2002  NA  25  NA  55.02%  42.66%  124%  NA  NA 
10/2000  10/2002  03/2003  NA  29  NA  53.86%  44.27%  119.17%  NA  NA 
05/2007  10/2008  02/2009  NA  21  NA   62.09%  18.71%  56.96%  NA  NA 
Estonia  
08/1997  06/1998  12/1998  12/2004  16  72  81.59%  133.53%  NA  47.96%  41% 
10/1997  07/1999  10/1999  03/2004  24  53  67.74%  152.22%  NA  79.76%  164% 
01/2007  06/2008  02/2009  NA  25  NA  58.27%  52.85%  165.24%  NA  NA 
Portugal 
02/2000  07/2001  07/2002  NA  29  NA  58.03%  30.23%  140.67%  NA   NA 
08/2000  08/2002  03/2003  04/2007  31  65  55.80%  20.86%  59.80%  NA  NA 
07/2007  10/2008  02/2009  NA  29  NA  55.30%  38.99%  88.50%  NA  NA 
Slovenia 
06/1994  05/1996  07/1996  03/1998  25  20  41.67%  35.10%  NA  10.73%  6.10% 
07/2007  02/2008  04/2008  NA  9  NA  30.96%  116.20%  145.16%  NA  NA 
09/2007  03/2009  03/2009  NA  18  NA  70.08%  115.81%  149.90%  NA  NA 
Finland  
04/2000  02/2001  09/2001  NA  17  NA  67.48%  165.15%  195.23%  NA  NA 
06/2000  06/2002  07/2004  NA  49  NA  72.91%  103.58%  123.87%  NA  NA 
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Tableau 2: Characteristics of individual market crises 
 
This table presents the characteristics of the stock market crises.  The beginning of a crisis is the month when the index reaches its historical maximum over the 2-year 
window prior to the month when the crash is triggered.  The beginning of the crash corresponds to the month when the CMAX intersects with a threshold. The date of trough 
is the month when the price index reaches its minimum. The date of recovery is the first month after the crash when the index reaches the pre-crash maximum. The magnitude 
of a crisis is the difference between the value of the index at its maximum and at its minimum. The length of the trough is the number of months between the date of the 
beginning of the crisis and the date of the trough. The length of the recovery period is the number of months for the index to return to the maximum. To avoid counting the 
same crisis more than once, a crisis is automatically eliminated if detected twice over a twelve month period. 
 
 
The duration of the crisis    Annual returns before 
crises 
Annual returns after 
crises 
Beginning 
of crises  
Beginning 
of crash   
Date of 
trough   






Price decline to 
trough  
One 







Sweden   
04/2000  08/2001  08/2002  NA  28  NA  63.21 %  84%  174.69%  NA  NA 
09/2000  08/2002  03/2003  04/2007  30  49  60.94 %  46.35%  86.59%  NA  NA 
05/2007  06/2008  01/2009  NA   20  NA   75.43 %  34.62%  86.16%  NA  NA 
United Kingdom  
08/2000  09/2001  09/2002  10/2007  25  61  44.22 %  2.13%  29.70%  NA   NA 
10/2000  10/2002  03/2003  07/2007  29   52   43.87 %  2.92%  32.96%  NA  NA 
05/2007  09/2008  02/2009  NA   21  NA   41.96 %  15.68%  47.48%  NA  NA 
United States  
07/2000  07/2001  06/2002  04/2007  23  58  39.99  %  14.94%  68.73%  -8.50%  NA 
08/2000  08/2002  08/2002  12/2006  24  52  43.24 %  11.99%  51.64%  -22.46%  NA  
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Table 4: Results of the Logit model estimation - stock market crises  
This table presents the results of the Logit model. The dependent variable equals 1 for the 12 months preceding 
the crisis, and 0 during quiet periods. The 11 months following the crisis are excluded from the sample. The 
independent variables represent the real interest rate (INT), the year-one-year change in stock prices (RET), the 
Price Earnings Ratio (PER), the inflation (INF), the ratio domestic credit to GDP (CREDIT) and the investor 
sentiment  (SENT
^).  The  statistics  tabulated  in  parentheses  correspond  to  the  p-values.  The  sample  period 
includes monthly data from April 1995 to June 2009. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%. 
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(1) Probability of crisis given no alarm. 
(2) Percentage of false alarms. 
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Table 5: Cross sectional Logit model estimation results  
 
This table presents the results of estimating the Logit model (3) where countries are pooled according to one 
of the determinants shown in the first column. The countries are allocated to one of tow groups depending on 
whether they are above or below the median of a specific determinant. Sent denotes the coefficient estimated on 
the sentiment variable (SENT
^). ∆ adj.R
2 is the change in adj. R
2 when the sentiment indicator is included in the 
logit model (3). Types A and B errors are calculated for alert thresholds set at 25%. The sample period includes 
monthly data from April 1995 to June 2009. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Countries below median   Countries above median    
Sent  ∆ adj.R
2  Type A  Type B  Sent  ∆ adj.R
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Table 6: Results of the Logit model estimation - stock market reversals 
points 
 
This table presents the results of the Logit model. The dependent variable equals 1 for the 12 months preceding 
the crisis, and 0 during quiet periods. The 11 months following the crisis are excluded from the sample. The 
independent variables represent the real interest rate (INT), the year-one-year change in stock prices (RET), the 
Price Earnings Ratio (PER), the inflation (INF), the ratio domestic credit to GDP (CREDIT) and the investor 
sentiment  (SENT
^).  The  statistics  tabulated  in  parentheses  correspond  to  the  p-values.  The  sample  period 
includes monthly data from April 1995 to June 2009. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%. 
 
Explanatory Variables   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
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(1) Probability of crisis given no alarm 
(2) Percentage of false alarms of total alarms 
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